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Abstract
Since the second half of the 20th century, immigrants and refugees from numerous countries have arrived in Switzerland.
With their long-term settlement, the immigrant minorities have established cultural and religious associations to maintain
their cultural and religious traditions and to teach their children the faith and religious practices from the country of origin.
In contrast to the first immigrant generation, the second generation has had concurrent social influences from the Swiss
ordinary school system and the cultural-religious traditions of their parents. This article asks to what extent the young
generations have continued the religious traditions brought by their parents and what changes have occurred in adapt-
ing religious practices, ideas and collective forms to the new socio-cultural environment. In addition, we study whether
and how the second generations have striven to move away from the often-marginalised social position of their parents
and engage with social recognition in Swiss society. To provide answers to these pertinent questions, the article will draw
on the examples of first and second-generation Muslims and Buddhists in Switzerland and refer to the theoretical model
designed by the American scholars Fred Kniss and Paul Numrich. The article argues that not only outward changes of re-
ligiosity are observable among second-generation youths, but also that despite an intensified degree of individualisation,
some of their newly founded youth associations strive for civic participation and social recognition in the public arena of
Swiss civil society.
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1. Introduction: Second-Generation Immigrant Youths
in European Diversity
In the second half of the 20th century, European coun-
tries faced large-scale arrivals of immigrant workers,
spouses, and refugees. Over time, they established
places of assembly and founded associations to main-
tain their religious and cultural traditions and to teach
their children the faith and religious practices from
the country of origin. The immigrants’ children were
socialised both in the European countries and in the
cultural-religious traditions of their parents’ country of
origin. The basic question both of the parent genera-
tions and of many academic studies has been to what
extent the young generations continue the religious tra-
ditions brought by the parents and what changes have
occurred in adapting religious practices and ideas to the
new socio-cultural environment. Numerous studies ar-
gue that there has been a shift towards the individualisa-
tion of religiosity and an emphasis on religious concepts
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over practices among Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh
youth (Herding, 2013; Limacher, Mattes, & Novak, 2019;
Sedgwick, 2015).
This article aims to provide a theory-led comparative
analysis of changes of religiosity from the first to the
second generation in two exemplary religious minorities,
i.e., Muslims and Buddhists in Switzerland. Additionally,
we will examine to what extent these generally individu-
alised young people and the religious youth associations
that are sometimes established strive for civic engage-
ment and social recognition in public arenas of Swiss soci-
ety.We define the second generation as the descendants
of immigrants who have been socialised in Switzerland,
whilst the first generation immigrated to Switzerland
as adults.
In theory, we apply the analytical approach by Kniss
and Numrich (2007) differentiating religious associations
concerning preferences of religious authority and en-
gagement with civic participation. Civic engagement ac-
tivities, we will argue, can also encompass actions to
make one’s voice heard with the aim of claiming re-
spect and social recognition for the minority and faith.
The topic of recognition admittedly covers an enormous
field of discussion and reflection (van den Brink & Owen,
2007). It covers analytical approaches, such as those car-
ried out by Honneth (1995), accentuating the ideal of
the autonomy of moral subjects, Taylor (1994), examin-
ing politics of recognition in multicultural societies, and
Fraser (2003, 2018), calling for a ‘politics’ of recognition
with a politics of redistribution.
The article will first introduce the theoretical per-
spective, followed by the two case studies of Muslims,
the majority with Kosovo-Albanian and Bosnian back-
ground, and Vietnamese Buddhists in Switzerland. We
employ the theoretical perspective to map generational
dynamics and the civic engagement of individuals and
religious associations. We selected these two minori-
ties as Muslims and Islam constitute the most pub-
licly discussed and stigmatised religious minority in
Switzerland (Ettinger, 2018) while Buddhism is positively
referenced in public discourse (Kollmar-Paulenz & Funk,
2010). Moreover, while Albanian-speaking and Bosnian
Muslims are considered as badly integrated, Vietnamese
enjoy good social recognition due to a positive stereotyp-
ing, as well as being integrated and successful (Beglinger,
2017). Following this, we discuss the appropriateness of
employing the moral-order map, assess reasons for the
degree of striving for social recognition and provide ex-
planations for the patterns of change. A brief conclusion
will highlight the main findings.
The main thesis of the article states that the gener-
ational transmission of religious practices and ideas in
Switzerland leads to decisive shifts of individually inter-
preted religiosity, dependent on specific contextual fac-
tors. Young Muslims position themselves socially to cor-
rect the bad image of Islam. Hence, independentMuslim
youth groups strive for social recognition in public arenas
of civil society. In contrast, young Buddhists growing up
with a positive image of their religion engage in civil soci-
ety more individually and informally.
2. Analytical Perspective: Moral Order Map
Studying civic engagement and one of its sub-forms,
the claim for respect and recognition, poses the diffi-
culty of a lack of a widely accepted definition and an
agreement on core items. For example, Keeter, Zukin,
Andolina, and Jenkins (2002) chose 19 core activities
which ranged from “voting, to volunteering, to sign-
ing petitions” (Keeter et al., 2002, p. 1). Alternatively,
Wray-Lake, Metzger, and Syvertsen (2016) listed “be-
haviours, values, knowledge, and skills that comprise po-
litical and prosocial contributions to community and so-
ciety” as characteristics of civic engagement (Wray-Lake
et al., 2016, p. 4). The authors recognised the highly mul-
tifaceted nature of civic engagement, which includes ac-
tions such as voting, volunteering, activism, and environ-
mental conservation. In contrast to the abundance of
quantitative studies, qualitative studies on religion and
civic engagement are comparatively rare. The study by
Todd and Rufa (2013) represents one of the few excep-
tions as they conducted 15 in-depth interviews to ex-
amine the extent to which Christian congregations in
the US-Midwest promote social justice. Also, Kniss and
Numrich (2007) proposed a heuristic ‘moral order map’
to locate the degrees of civic engagement of immigrant
religious communities in the greater Chicago area. The
map ranges from no civic engagement to various forms
of engagement in the arenas of civil society, the govern-
ment, and the economy. The authors defined civic en-
gagement as “the public action of individuals and groups
as they interact with and participate in the organisa-
tions, associations, and institutions of society” (Kniss &
Numrich, 2007, p. 10).We have identified this qualitative
approach as being particularly suitable for the analytical
aims of the article as it enables the comparative study of
religious individuals and groups and takes into consider-
ation religious rationales for civic engagement and differ-
ent authority structures of groups. The approach rests on
three dimensions of differentiation, i.e., on the degree of
sectarianism, on the locus and emphasis of the moral au-
thority of the religious group, and on the most central
moral project of the group (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 9).
The ‘degree of sectarianism’ of a religious commu-
nity is decisive insofar as sects commonly emphasise
specific religious interpretations and practices and break
with long-established interpretations. In protest against
established tradition, the sectarian view claims to offer
the authentic interpretation of the founder’s message,
relaying it into the correct words and a true way of life
(Kniss & Numrich, 2007, pp. 21–34). This dimension of-
ten strongly affects the other two dimensions.
Secondly, the authors position a religious commu-
nity’s ‘locus of moral authority’ on a spectrum between
the poles of an individual and a collectivemoral authority
(Kniss & Numrich, 2007, pp. 38–40). The individual as the
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prime place of moral authority bases his/her decisions
and values on personal reasons and experiences. In con-
trast, the collective locus of moral authority is based on
an understanding that “the authority to define ultimate
values is grounded in the collective religious tradition”
(Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 40). Believers are expected to
follow the instructions of the ecclesiastical and/or scrip-
tural authority.
Thirdly, the dimension of a religious community’s
‘moral project’ also ranges between the poles of groups
with a tendency towards collectivist moral projects
and those with a tendency towards individualist moral
projects (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 55–65). The content
and communal form of a moral project at the individu-
alist end of the continuum “[seek] the maximisation of
individual utility” (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, p. 56) and the
moral improvement and/or moral self-perfection of the
individual. The opposite side of the continuum, the col-
lectivity as a moral project, favours the collective good
and aims at “establishing a just and righteous social or-
der rather than reforming individuals” (Kniss & Numrich,
2007, p. 56). Collectivist moral projects may result in
joint civic actions with public criticism of unjust social
structures and the aim of amending social problems. In
the US, Kniss and Numrich point to Roman Catholic and
Muslim immigrant communities as prime examples of
this expression with their civic engagement for poor and
marginalised people (Kniss & Numrich, 2007, pp. 60–63).
Our case studies illustrate these different types of
civic engagement. Using the approach by Kniss and
Numrich (see Figure 1), we indicate the shift between
the first and second generation. While the Muslim and
Buddhist first generations tend towards the collectivity
as a locus of authority, the authority locus of the second
generations shifts towards the individual with a trend to-
wards a societal moral project.
3. Analysing Immigrant Religious Minorities and
Generational Dynamics
We will use the model to analyse the range of the first
and second generation. While Kniss and Numrich fo-
cused solely on immigrant religious communities, we
have also included the people of the first and second
generation to examine generational changes based on
the model.
Overall, we suggest that the civic participation of im-
migrant communities leaning towards the poles of the so-
cietal moral project will also encompass activities claim-
ing respect and social recognition in society. In concep-
tual terms, Fraser suggested “to treat recognition as a
question of social status,” (Fraser, 2018, p. 89, empha-
sis in original) terming it status model. She contrasts her
status model with the so-called standard identity model
which, following Taylor and Honneth, claims respect and
recognition for specific groups and their cultural identity
(Fraser, 2018, p. 88–89). Fraser held this identity model
as “deeply problematic” as the model would reify cul-
ture and “impose a single, drastically simplified group
identity, which denies the complexity of people’s lives”
(Fraser, 2018, p. 89). The status model, however, would
analyse the social status of group members in the per-
Individual as Moral Project (Person)
Individual as
Locus of Authority
Collecvity as
Locus of Authority
Collecvity as Moral Project (Society)
Figure 1.Model by Kniss and Numrich (2007).
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spective of justice as “some individuals and groups are
denied the status of full partners in social interaction sim-
ply as a consequence of institutionalised patterns of [less
or minor] cultural value” ascribed to them (Fraser, 2018,
p. 91). In this regard, Fraser opted for a conception of jus-
tice and norm of “parity of participation” (Fraser, 2018,
p. 94) which criticises forms of misrecognition as “it de-
nies some individuals and groups the possibility of partic-
ipating on a par with others in social interaction” (Fraser,
2018, p. 92).
While scholars in practical philosophy and sociology
have paid little attention to religion and religious groups
in discussing claims for recognition, Fraser explicitly in-
cluded issues of minority religious practices and contro-
versies (Fraser, 2018, pp. 99–101). She demonstrated
that her proposed status model relying on the norms
of participatory parity and justice provide a standard for
evaluating “the effects of institutionalised patterns of cul-
tural value on the relative standing of minorities vis-à-vis
majorities” (Fraser, 2018, p. 100, emphasis in original).
In this regard, claimants demanding cultural or religious
recognition were to show “that the institutionalisation
ofmajority cultural norms denies them participatory par-
ity” as well as to show “that the practices whose recog-
nition they seek do not themselves deny participatory
parity” neither to various group members nor to non-
members (Fraser, 2018, p. 100). While applying Fraser’s
status model, we need to analyse whether members or
groups of the discussed religious minorities are denied
any parity of participation.
3.1. Muslims in Switzerland
In Switzerland, the first Muslims arrived due to recruit-
ing schemes from Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, fol-
lowed by considerable numbers of Muslims fleeing the
disintegrating state of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. In 2019,
the heterogenic Muslim minority of some 458,000 peo-
ple were composed of 37% from the Balkans, 11.5%
from Turkey, Muslims from various African and Asian
countries, and 35% Swiss Muslims. The latter comprises
large parts of naturalised former Kosovo-Albanians,
Bosnians and Turks. Nine out of ten Muslims adhere
to Sunni traditions (Monnot, 2013; Tunger-Zanetti &
Schneuwly-Purdie, 2019).
In Switzerland, according to the 2014 survey com-
pleted by the Federal Office of Statistics (2016), only
a small percentage of first-generation Muslims practise
their religion by visiting the mosque and praying daily.
The percentage of Muslims who visit the mosque weekly
was stated as 12% and those prayingmore or less daily as
almost 30% (Federal Office of Statistics, 2016, pp. 9, 12).
Overall, Gianni, Giugni, and Michel (2015) put the per-
centage of religiously observant Muslims at 10 to 15%
(Gianni et al., 2015, pp. 86–90). In contrast, the vast
majority of less to non-religious Muslims rarely per-
form the five prayers a day and only occasionally visit
the mosque.
Political scientist Matteo Gianni emphasised the va-
riety of individual ways in which the Islamic faith and
prescriptions were lived among the silent majority of
Muslims in the early 2000s (Gianni, 2005, pp. 6–7).
Meanwhile, these varieties have grown since then.
Translating Gianni’s findings to the moral order map,
the individual as the locus of authority is character-
istic of many Muslims in Switzerland. Observant reli-
gious Muslims tend more towards the collectivity as rep-
resented by the mosque and a knowledgeable imam
(Gianni, 2005, p. 24–25). The content of the moral
project seems to be more individualised among the less
and non-religious Muslims, while it tends more towards
collectivity with the religious Muslims. This is expressed
in activities such as volunteer work and giving donations.
The graphical representation on the map reproduces
the wide range of understandings and attitudes of first-
generation Muslims as a strung-out ellipse. The various
mosques, as places with numerous social, cultural and
religious services, tend towards civic engagement on the
community level, and thosewith an employed imam lean
towards the collectivity as the locus of authority (Gianni
et al., 2015, pp. 63–79; Martens, 2013).
The generation of young Muslims aged 15 to 30 con-
stitutes approximately 120,000 people in Switzerland.
The survey by Käppler and Morgenthaler (2013) on re-
ligiosity among young Christians, Muslims, Hindus and
Jews aged 13 to 17 showed, despite its limitation to
Swiss-German conurbation areas, that a minority per-
centage of the surveyed young Muslims are either non-
religious (16.4%) or highly religious (11.5%). A strongma-
jority of 72% can be labelled as somewhat or selectively
religious (Zehnder Grob, 2013, p. 64).
Furthermore, the large-scale qualitative study by
Baumann, Endres, Martens, and Tunger-Zanetti (2017)
on youngMuslims aged 15 to 30 provided in-depth views
of religious attitudes and practices of young Muslims.
The researchers employed varied approaches to contact
young male and female Muslims, visiting youth centres,
contacting key persons at mosques, directly address-
ing young Muslims, and establishing contacts via the
Facebook site ‘Imra Cy’ and the project’s university web-
site. The sample strove for a large spectrum of young
Muslims concerning gender, age, education, religious
profile and country of origin of the parents.
Overall, the researchers conducted 61 narrative indi-
vidual interviews, 28 with young Muslim women and 33
with young Muslim men (Baumann et al., 2017, pp. 7–9).
The analysis of the multifarious data which comprised
more than 5,000 minutes audio recording evidenced a
cognisant and reflexive approach towards Islamic ideas
and a decrease of religious practices among the inter-
viewed young Muslims (Baumann et al., 2017, pp. 11,
15, 29). In contrast to their parents, young Muslims, a
large proportion of themAlbanian-speaking and Bosnian
Muslims, attempt to understand Islamic ideas and norms
in their terms, suitable for their situation in Switzerland.
They distance themselves from the religious-cultural
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practices of their parents (Baumann et al., 2017, p. 13)
and take a comparative and scrutinising stance towards
the Islamic norms and guidelines of the various Islamic
authorities (Tunger-Zanetti, Martens, & Endres, 2019,
p. 195). For example, as Yalçuk (male, 26 years) explains
concerning the observation of Islamic commandments:
“I simply need a good explanation. It must make sense to
me” (Baumann et al., 2017, p. 28, translation by the au-
thors). Statements such as this indicate that the varied
spectrum of understanding and practising Islam is tend-
ing towards the pole of the individual as the locus of au-
thority on the map.
In addition, due to the decisive critical discourse
about Islam andMuslims in Switzerland, almost all young
Muslims report negative experiences of discrimination,
exclusion and rejection (Baumann et al., 2017, p. 31).
Young female and male Muslims developed different
strategies to handle the pejorative Islamdiscourse.While
some retreat to the private domain with their religious
practices and others adapt these selectively at work,
a third group emphasises their Muslim belonging and
claims the right to practice in public. This group openly
criticises the negative image of Islam and demands rights
and claims social recognition by public actions. In the
words of Fraser, this group of young Muslims speaking
out criticises “being denied the status of a full partner in
social interaction and prevented from participating as a
peer in social life as a consequence of institutionalised
patterns of cultural value that constitute one as com-
paratively unworthy of respect or esteem” (Fraser, 2018,
p. 92). The negative image of Islam and Muslims repro-
duced by the media and conservative politicians consti-
tutes a “status subordination” which denies the “norm
of participatory parity” (Fraser, 2018, p. 92). In contrast
to their parents who tend to remain in a marginalised
societal position, often in the private realm and some in
the mosque, determined young Albanian-speaking and
Bosnian Muslims engage and participate in the public
arena of Swiss civil society and call for respect and recog-
nition. Hence, applied to the graphical representation on
themap, youngMuslims leanmore than their parents to-
wards the pole of the individual as the locus of authority
and more towards the pole of the collectivity as a moral
project (see Figure 2).
Turning to Muslim youth organisations, the explo-
rative study by Endres, Tunger-Zanetti, Behloul, and
Baumann (2013) employed qualitative methods of visit-
ing internal and public religious and leisure events organ-
ised by these organisations, conducting participant ob-
servations and semi-structured interviews and observed
web-based activities of Muslim youth groups on their
websites and social media platforms (Endres et al., 2013,
pp. 26–27; Tunger-Zanetti & Endres, 2019, p. 127). The
study provided evidence that only a minority of young
Muslims had been affiliated to a youth group in 2012.
Among the approximately 100 youth groups, the major-
ity were closely connected to a mosque, usually headed
by an imamand continuing the samepatterns of national-
linguistic bonding (Tunger-Zanetti & Endres, 2019, p. 134).
However, the close organisational linkage brought forth
critical voices like that of 25-year-old Gezim:
Individual as Moral Project (Person)
Individual as
Locus of Authority
range of
2nd
generaon
Muslims
range of
1st
generaon
Muslims
Collecvity as
Locus of Authority
Collecvity as Moral Project (Society)
Mosque
Mosque
Mosque youth group
Independent
youth
groups
Figure 2. Locating first and second-generation Muslims on the moral order map.
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There is no common language between Swiss Muslim
youngsters and the imams. On the one hand, there
is a generation gap, on the other, the imams com-
monly do not speak and teach in Swiss German, but in
Turkish, Albanian, etc….The imams do not match the
language of the youths and often do not know the sit-
uation in which the youths live in Switzerland. (Endres
et al., 2013, p. 66, translation by the authors)
This frustration and the will to engage beyond their eth-
nic group has led young Muslims to set up independent
youth groups, traversing established infrastructures of
mosque associations and linguistic, national, and cultural
boundaries. In these groups, apart from organising var-
ious leisure and sports activities in an Islamic setting,
young Muslims are eager to teach themselves an obser-
vant Muslim life with an understanding of Islamic scripts,
ideas and values. Importantly, young Muslim men and
women stress a conscious self-understanding of being
‘Swiss Muslims’ rather than merely tolerated “Muslims
in Switzerland” (Tunger-Zanetti & Endres, 2019, p. 135).
As 18-year-old Bosnian Ismeta explains:
I would love to see something that serves the
whole Swiss community. So people would notice
that Muslims belong to Switzerland and are not only
THERE. That they not only exist but that we are a part
of society. I would also wish that they get more polit-
ically active. (personal interview 179, research mate-
rial 2015, translation by the authors)
Such volunteer activities seek, among other things, to
help gradually change and develop the public image
of Muslims and Islam. In addition, groups such as the
Association of Islamic Youth Switzerland challenge the
pejorative public discourse and occasionally organise
public activities such as information booths, participate
in Christian-Muslim dialogue and at times gather for
demonstrations to disseminate their ideas about Islam
and the Muslim way of life (Tunger-Zanetti & Endres,
2019, p. 136). With all due caution in turning these find-
ings into a graphical representation on themap, indepen-
dentMuslim youth groups strongly lean towards the pole
of the collectivity as a moral project and collective ac-
tions in the political realm. Figure 2 translates the find-
ings to the map.
The heuristic figure displays the strong shift of
second-generation youths towards the individual as the
locus of authority. Due to the pejorative societal dis-
course about Islam and Muslims, more young Muslims
appear to be socially engaged and aim to change the
stigmatising picture. The range of attitudes remains
wide, however.
3.2. Buddhists in Switzerland
We analysed shifts between the first and second gen-
eration of Vietnamese Buddhists by using data from
a qualitative research project carried out from 2016
to 2020. In the study, the authors studied the reli-
giosity of young Vietnamese Buddhists in Switzerland
and Germany. We conducted narrative interviews with
22 young Vietnamese Buddhist adults between 17 and
30 years of age at the time of the study. The sam-
ple included persons who were involved in the pago-
das and people with little to no relation to the pagodas.
We gained the interview partners by using recommen-
dations, key persons from pagodas and Buddhist youth
organisations as well as social media and youth-specific
events in Switzerland and Germany. Method-wise, the
authors proceeded ethnographically and used participat-
ing observations in the pagodas. In this article, we draw
upon data from Switzerland.
In 2018, about 15,000 Vietnamese lived in
Switzerland. The majority came between 1975 and 1995
because of the VietnamWar (Weigelt, 2013, p. 107). The
German-speaking part of Switzerland, in particular, pro-
vided Vietnamese contingent refugees with a new home
away from home during this period.
Vietnamese immigrants are an ethnically and re-
ligiously heterogeneous community in Switzerland.
Informed estimates assume some 50% of the Viet-
namese people are part ofMahayana Buddhism. In 2020,
three pagodas existed in Switzerland, with two pagodas
near Berne and Lucerne in the Swiss-German region and
the third pagoda near Lausanne in the French-speaking
region. In the pagodas, Vietnamese Buddhists practice
a mixture of Chan and Pure Land Buddhism. The monks
and nuns emphasise the recitation of sutras and the
acquisition of religious merit. About 80–90% of the prac-
tising Buddhists in pagodas are female and older than
40 years (Baumann, Eulberg, & Weigelt, 2011, p. 17).
Young adults, however, are strongly underrepresented.
Fieldwork impressions gainedby the authors suggest that
the average age is shifting even higher. Affiliated associ-
ations of lay Buddhists (Buddhist youth association) sup-
port two of the pagodas. In these Vietnamese Buddhist
youth groups, the lay Buddhists practice Buddhism and
continue elements of Vietnamese culture and tradition.
The majority of Vietnamese Buddhists are likely
to belong to the spectrum within the category of
the selectively religiously oriented. Likewise, a minor-
ity of first-generation Vietnamese Buddhists do not
attend a pagoda at all and practice only in the pri-
vate domestic sphere, representing the category of reli-
giously distanced.
Therefore, on the moral order map, we can show a
wide range of religious understanding among the first
generation, tending towards the pole of the individual
as a moral project. In addition, as most Vietnamese of
the immigrant generation highly respect the Buddhist
monks and nuns as guides for individual and collective
religiousness (cf. Baumann, 2000, pp. 61–67), a major-
ity tends towards the collectivity as the locus of author-
ity. Collective social and civic engagement beyond their
community only rarely occurs. We noticed small differ-
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ences between the alignments of the three pagodas. The
two pagodas near Lucerne and Lausanne, for example,
present themselves as open to the Swiss majority soci-
ety. The pagoda in Berne, on the other hand, is primarily
aimed at its community.
The spectrumof second-generation religiosity ranges
from non-religious to a small minority of religious peo-
ple. The majority of respondents can be categorised as
selectively religious. They only visit the pagodas during
festivals but not for regular chanting and services at the
weekend. Transferred to the moral order map, the posi-
tioning of religious authority strongly shifts towards the
pole of the individual as the locus of authority.
The minority of young Buddhists involved in the
Buddhist youth associations is rather irregular and self-
determined. On the moral order map, the second gener-
ation is shown as tending towards both the pole of the
individual as a moral project and the pole of the collec-
tivity as a moral project.
Since young Vietnamese Buddhists are less repre-
sented in pagodas, they practice Buddhism more as a
way of life. They are involved in associations of the ma-
jority society, in the neighbourhood or the inter-religious
area. This form of religiosity is directed at the individ-
ual and civic engagement in the informal sphere. What
is striking is that they distance themselves strongly from
the parent generation. They often refer to the religios-
ity of their parents’ generation and demand a stronger
separation between Vietnamese culture and Buddhism.
As 25-year-old Nathalie emphasises:
Tradition and religion go hand in hand and that some-
times bothers me because I already have the Swiss
in me, or I am already quite Swiss. And this has al-
ways bothered me, the conservative elements, which
is why I decided to get to the bottom of it for myself
by searching for literature myself. (personal interview,
translation by the authors)
Second-generation Buddhists choose religious authori-
ties by themselves but do not accord them authority by
dint of their position. In this regard, themajority of young
Buddhists tackle religion independently and based on
their own choices. Quite a few align with theWestern im-
age of Buddhism and the Buddhism represented by the
Vietnamese Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh. The 22-year-
old female Buddhist Kim describes this examination of
her religiosity:
A line [of Buddhist interpretation] that I like is just that
of Thich Nhat Hanh….I like it more because it is more
related to everyday life and to mindfulness. I also feel
that it brings me something in everyday life. I also no-
tice how it is practical, everyday life and what is said.
This is only my personal opinion, but when I joined
Mahayana Buddhism, it simply didn’t make sense for
me. (personal interview, translation by the authors)
The quote highlights the attitude of young Buddhist
adults towards their religion and questions the religious
practice of their parents’ generation. It also indicates a
turn towards a Western understanding of Buddhism as
expressed by Zen Master Thich Nhat Hanh.
Unlike Muslims, young Vietnamese have experi-
enced less discrimination due to their religious affilia-
tion. Discrimination, or the attribution of foreignness,
occurs more because of their ethnic roots and appear-
ance. Young Vietnamese react with different strategies.
As a rule, over-adaptation to the Swiss majority society
is evident. In addition, success in education is of great
importance (cf. Baumann et al., 2011, p. 14). They do
not seek social recognition through official groups in
the same way that Muslims do, but through informal
engagement and adaptation. Their civil society involve-
ment is manifested in the informal sphere and as part of
Buddhism which is seen as a way of life. 21-year-old Mai
Linh emphasises:
If you practice meditation or pray, or always go to
temples, sure it’s good, it certainly helps you, but
I find that all of this…you find it in the smallest action,
e.g., you bring in your neighbour’s newspaper every
day….I think it starts at the very beginning and if you
can’t be a good person in everyday life or treat other
people in a way that you would treat people in the
temple, then you can‘t be a good Buddhist. (personal
interview, translation by the authors)
Like the female Buddhist Mai Linh, the majority of re-
spondents understand civic engagement as part of their
‘Buddhist being.’ Here, however, a shift towards the pole
of the individual as the locus of authority is striking as the
Vietnamese youth only irregularly attend collective reli-
gious services and gatherings (see Figure 3). Compared
to the parent generation, the members of the second
generation are stronger volunteers in Swiss civil society
and lesswithin the Vietnamese Buddhist pagodas. Unlike
Muslims, however, they are not involved in the political
or formal sphere. They are involved in informal activities.
In conclusion, it seems justified to say that young
Buddhists seek social recognition through established
structures. Referring to Fraser’s status model, we ob-
served that Buddhists in our case study achieve partic-
ipatory parity based on upward mobility. Religious or-
ganisations support this mobility in strengthening the so-
cial recognition of the individual and less the collective
(Bankston & Zhou, 1995; Le, 2020). The interviewees of
our study are not much involved in religious organisa-
tions, as they perceive a lack of peers. Nevertheless, we
assume that the pagodas and youth organisations influ-
ence the young adults’ search for recognition. A clearma-
jority has adapted structurally to Swiss majority society
and is engaged in the informal sector of community activ-
ities to demonstrate their belonging. Figure 3 translates
the findings to the map.
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Figure 3. Locating first and second-generation Buddhists on the moral order map.
4. Discussion and Explanation
In this article, we use the moral order map and the ap-
proximate graphical location of first and second genera-
tions and their religious organisations to highlight gen-
erational dynamics. An advantage of this approach is
that it demonstrates the wide range of religious self-
understanding of bothMuslim and Buddhist generations
in Switzerland.
The used model is not without shortcomings, how-
ever. The actual location of a mosque, pagoda and youth
group on themap can only be approximately set, and this
is evenmore the case as regards locating the range of the
first and second generations of theMuslim and Buddhist
minorities. To some extent, the spectra can be only sug-
gestive, as representative data on the different character-
istics of the content of the moral project and the locus of
authority are not widely available.
Nevertheless, the map provides an expedient frame
to visually underscore the second generation’s shift to-
wards the pole of the individual practitioner as the locus
of authority. The individualising shift of young Muslims
and Buddhists socialised in Switzerland can be attributed
to the overall trend of individualisation prevalent in
Switzerland, Western Europe, North America and else-
where. In recent decades, the dominant idea of religios-
ity as individual and private has developed, distanced
from institutional religion and with almost unlimited op-
tions for the individual to select and define religious
contents and practices (Stolz, Könemann, Schneuwly-
Perduie, Engelberger, & Krüggeler, 2014, pp. 181–186,
200–202). Our results of a shift towards individualisa-
tion are mirrored by similar studies on young Muslims
in other European countries (Herding, 2013; Jacobsen,
2009; Sedgwick, 2015; Voas&Fleischmann, 2012), young
Tamil Hindus in Germany (Marla-Küsters, 2015) and
young Thai and Tibetan Buddhists in Great Britain and
Switzerland (Schlieter, Kind, & Lauer, 2014; Thanissaro,
2014). Also, for Canada, Ramji (2008) and Beyer and
Ramji (2013), examining the religiosity of children from
immigrant families, argued that young Muslims, Hindus
and Buddhists considered themselves individually re-
sponsible for their religiousness. The intergenerational
changes appear thus as a general trend in second-
generation studies. Young adults negotiate their affilia-
tion to religious institutions as part of their biography
and their self-determined religiousness.
We assume that the reflexive and critical stance of
youngMuslims and Buddhists towards the religious prac-
tice of their parents’ generation is strongly influenced
by the Swiss school system. Children and adolescents
are taught to ask for reasons and to think for them-
selves (Baumann et al., 2017, p. 28). Emphasis is placed
by the school system on understanding and explanation.
This socialisation towards reflexivity does not sit eas-
ily alongside rituals that young people often find bor-
ing and difficult to comprehend. Overall, there is a clear
distancing from mosques and pagodas as places of reli-
gious authority.
Despite the overall trend of individualisation, a mi-
nority of young Muslims deliberately gather in youth
groups. Notably, some young Muslims founded inde-
pendent groups to transverse the national-linguistic pat-
terns of mosque-affiliated youth groups. These indepen-
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dent groups do not only enable the young Muslims to
self-responsibly organise religious, leisure and sports ac-
tivities in an Islamic setting. They also serve to teach
themselves an enhanced understanding of Islamic val-
ues, ideas and scripts and to jointly encourage living an
observant Muslim life. While each young participant in-
dividually strives to deepen his and her Islamic compre-
hension reflexively, this endeavour is purposefully jointly
done in a collective setting. Among these youngMuslims,
individualisation and distancing from the mosque does
not necessarily include privatisation but the setting up
of autonomous community structures to consciously sup-
port a self-empowerment and a challenging of the as-
cribed status subordination and misrecognition (Endres
et al., 2013, pp. 63–75; Tunger-Zanetti & Endres, 2019,
pp. 135–141).
Furthermore, our findings demonstrate that inde-
pendent Muslim youth groups and individual young
Buddhists are more open to social engagement and par-
ticipation in society than the established organisations
founded by the first generations. In fact, engagement
with social recognition among the first generations takes
place within the mosque and pagoda, if at all, and is
only occasionally voiced in the field of community ac-
tivities. In contrast, engaged young Muslims—albeit lim-
ited in number—consciously campaign for their cause in
the public arenas of politics and civil society. As distinct
from these dedicated Muslims, young Buddhists commit
themselves via the less outspoken informal engagement.
They interpret Buddhism as a way of life, which finds ex-
pression in actions such as respecting and helping neigh-
bours and engaging in associations within Swiss society.
In particular, young Muslims increasingly collectively
engage to achieve social recognition and a participa-
tory parity. Young Muslims are confronted globally with
the negative discourse of Islam (Bozorgmehr & Kasinitz,
2018). Islam as an immigrant religion is generally more
socially present than Buddhism, which is less regarded as
an immigrant phenomenon. This stigmatisation and sta-
tus subordination of Islam and Muslims corresponds to
the positioning constraint that representatives of Islam
in Europe express themselves more publicly than rep-
resentatives of Buddhist institutions. The engagement
of young Muslims and their claim for recognition is mo-
tivated by this discourse. As we have argued, young
Muslims are keen to enhance the image of their religion.
They work to counter the negative image by public ac-
tions in the communal and political arenas, calling for re-
spect and social recognition of Muslims. They demand
the same rights and an end to stigmatisation and so-
cial marginalisation. “We are also a part of Switzerland,”
declared a homemade poster held by a young Muslim
demonstrator on the Day Against Islamophobia and
Racism in 2011 in Bern (Figure 4).
In contrast, the engagement of young Buddhists ap-
pears to be more informal and less visible. In 2018,
a young Buddhist woman put on an exhibition pre-
senting her family history and her perspective on her
Vietnamese roots having grown up in Switzerland. She in-
tended to show how integration into a Vietnamese fam-
Figure 4. Young Muslim demonstrator on the Day Against Islamophobia and Racism (Endres et al., 2013, p. 52.).
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Figure 5. “Either saying ‘I’m Swiss’ or ‘I’m Vietnamese’ didn’t feel quite right to me.” Image from Hieu thao—With Love
and Respect (2018), provided by Thi My Lien Nguyen.
ily and Swiss society can go hand in hand. In the private
sphere, the family engages in Vietnamese culture, while
in the public sphere the family has adapted to the condi-
tions in Switzerland. While it is important for Muslims to
influence the discourse, the young woman presents so-
cial participation at the micro-level with her exhibition.
The youngBuddhistsmay benefit from the fact that other
Buddhist migrants like Tibetans have already established
themselves in Switzerland (Schlieter et al., 2014). The
positive discourse about Buddhism will certainly also be
helpful to them.
Both cases demonstrate the stronger interest of both
second generations to be more visible in Swiss society
than the first generation. Notably, they highlight the im-
portance of the impact made by the societal discourse
of stigmatisation, in contrast to idealisation on the social
engagement of youngMuslims and Buddhists in different
public arenas.
5. Conclusion
This article aimed to provide a theory-led comparison
and analysis of the first and second generations of
two immigrant minorities and how they interpret be-
ing religious. Furthermore, we intended to study the
generational dynamics of how religion is perceived
among second-generation youth. Themodel by Kniss and
Numrich (2007) provided a convenient analytical frame-
work within which to discern characteristics of the reli-
gious self-understanding of first and second generations
and the religious organisations of these minorities. This
comparison enabled us to highlight the range of how reli-
gion is personally interpreted and led to a graphical spec-
trum of understanding religion as more individualised or
more collective.
The examples of Muslims and Buddhists illustrated
the shifts of religious understanding among the immi-
grant generation towards a more individualised inter-
pretation among the second generations. In addition, it
became obvious that due to the negative discourse on
Islam, youngMuslims proved to bemore civically and po-
litically engaged in the public arena of civil society than
the socially positively-perceived young Buddhists.
Apparently, the form and interpretation of being
more or less religious among young Muslims and
Buddhists are thus strongly aligned with dominant pat-
terns of religiosity in Switzerland. These descendants of
immigrants have overwhelmingly been structurally inte-
grated into school, apprenticeships, and professions, and
to a large extent assimilated into the dominant idea of
religion and religiosity. Though the contents of their re-
ligious practices and ideas are different, the underlying
grammar of religion as individual to a large extent has
become similar.
Young Muslims draw inspiration for civic participa-
tion from Muslim intellectuals such as Mohamed Naved
Johari, Islamic preachers and rap-musicians. For young
Buddhists, on the other hand, the 14th Dalai Lama and
the ZenMaster Thich Nhat Hanh serve as role models for
individual engagement in their local neighbourhood.
Despite these ideals and role models, only a minority
of young people engage in youth activities and groups.
Although they are often few, these second-generation
people have realised it is down to them to uplift what
is thus far a marginal social position as an immigrant and
ethnic minority in a reluctantly welcoming Swiss society.
While young Muslims get involved in organisations and
politically claim their affiliation to Swiss society, young
Buddhists get involved in the informal sector to demon-
strate their affiliation with Swiss society. Social engage-
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ment such as volunteer services and participation in lo-
cal initiatives such as inter-religious dialogue are useful
means to make themselves visible and heard or to show
that they belong to the Swiss society. Importantly, it also
enables links with influential institutions in Swiss civil so-
ciety, thereby strengthening their civic engagement in
striving for social participation, respect and recognition.
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